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INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we want to do more than just giving another -be it 
unusual- example of the utility of the fist-order predicate calculus in 
proving the correctness of programs. In addition we want to show how 
thanks to a systematic use of the first-order predicate calculus fairly 
general -almost “syntactic”- considerations about the formal manipu- 
lations involved can provide valuable guidance for the smooth discovery 
of an otherwise surprising argument. 
For proofs of program correctness two fairly different styles have been 
developed, “operational” proofs and “assertional” proofs. Operational 
correctness proofs are based on a model of computation, and the corre- 
sponding computational histories are the subject matter of the con- 
siderations. In assertional correctness proofs the possibility of interpreting 
the program text as executable code is ignored and the program text 
itself is the subject matter of the formal considerations. 
Operational proofs -although older and, depending on one’s education, 
perhaps more “natural” than assertional proofs- have proved to be tricky 
to design. For more complicated programs the required classification of 
the possible computational histories tends to lead to an exploding case 
analysis in which it becomes very clumsy to verify that no possible 
sequence of events has been overlooked, and it was in response to the 
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disappointing experiences with operational proofs that the assertional 
style has been developed. 
The design of an assertional proof -as we shall see below- may present 
problems, but, on the whole, experience seems to indicate that assertional 
proofs are much more effective than operational ones in reducing the 
gnawing uncertainty whether nothing has been overlooked. This ex- 
perience, already gained while dealing with sequential programs, was 
strongly confirmed while dealing with concurrent programs: the circum- 
stance that the ratios of the speeds with which the sequential components 
proceed is left undefined greatly increases the class of computational 
histories that an operational argument would have to cover! 
In the following we shall present the development of an assertional 
correctness proof of a program of N-fold concurrency. The program has 
been taken from the middle of a whole sequence of concurrent programs 
of increasing complexity -the greater complexity at the one end being 
the consequence of finer grains of interleaving-. For brevity’s sake we 
have selected here from this sequence the simplest item for which the 
assertional correctness proof displays the characteristic we wanted to show. 
(It is not the purpose of this paper to provide supporting material in 
favour of the assertional style: in fact, our example is so simple that an 
operational proof for it is still perfectly feasible.) 
In the following y denotes a vector of N components y [i] for 0 G i <N. 
With the identifier f we shall denote a vector-valued function of a vector- 
valued argument, and the algorithm concerned solves the equation 
(1) Y =f(Y) 
or, introducing fo, fl, f2, . . . for the components of f 
(2) y[i]=fg(y) for O<i<N. 
It is assumed that the initial value of y and the function f are such 
that repeated assignments of the form 
(3) CY[4:=fdYD 
will lead in a finite number of steps to y being a solution of (1). In (3) 
we have used Lamport’s notation of the angle brackets: they enclose 
“atomic actions” which can be implemented by ensuring between their 
executions mutual exclusion in time. For the sake of termination we 
assume that the sequence of i-values for which the assignments (3) are 
carried out is (the proper begin of) a sequence in which each i-value 
occurs infinitely often. (We deem this property guaranteed by the usual 
assumption of “finite speed ratios”; he who refuses to make that as- 
sumption can read the following as a proof of partial correctness.) 
For the purpose of this paper it suffices to know that functions f exist 
such that with a proper initial value of y equation (1) will be solved by 
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a finite number of assignments (3). How for a given function f and initial 
value y this property can be established is not the subject of this paper. 
(He who refuses to assume that the function f and the initial value of y 
have this property is free to do so: he can, again, read the following as a 
proof of partial correctness that states that when our concurrent program 
has terminated, (1) is satisfied.) 
Besides the vector y there is -for the purpose of controlling termi- 
nation- a vector h, with boolean elements h[i] for 0 G i <N, all of which 
are true to start with. We now consider the following program of N-fold 
concurrency, in which each atomic action assigns a value to at most one 
of the array elements mentioned. We give the program first and shall 
explain the notation afterwards. 
The concurrent program we are considering consists of the following N 
components cpntt (0 Q i < N) : 
cpntt : 
LO: do ((Ej: h[j])) + 
Ll: (if y[i]=ft(y) -+ h[i]:=false) 
[I YL-WfdY) + YPl:=ft(YD; 
L2j : (A j: (h[j]:=true)) 
fi 
od 
In line LO, “(E j: h[j])” is an abbreviation for 
(Ej: Ogj<N: h[j]) ; 
for the sake of brevity we shall use this abbreviation throughout this 
paper. By writing ((E j: h[j])) in the guard we have indicated that the 
inspection whether a true h[j] can be found is an atomic action. 
The opening angle bracket “(” in Ll has two corresponding closing 
brackets, corresponding to the two “atomic alternatives”; it means that 
in the same atomic action the guards are evaluated and either “h[i]: = 
false” or “y[i] : = f*(y)” is executed. In the latter case, N separate atomic 
actions follow, each setting an Fv[j] to true : in line L2j we have used the 
abbreviation “(A j: (h[j] : = true))” for the program that performs the N 
atomic actions (h[O]: = true) through (h[N- 11: = true) in some order 
which we don’t specify any further. 
In our target state y is a solution of (l), or, more explicitly 
(4 (4: y/[jl=fiW 
holds. We first observe that (4) is an invariant of the repeatable statements, 
i.e. once true it remains true. In the alternative constructs always the 
first atomic alternative will then be selected, and this leaves y, and hence 
(4) unaffected. We can even conclude a stronger invariant 
(5) non (Ej: h[j]) and (Aj: YLil = fdy)) 
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or, equivalently 
(5’) (A.i: no* N.il) and b4.i: ~[jl=fd~)) 
for, when (5) holds, no assignment h[i] : =false can destroy the truth of 
(Aj: non &j]). When (4) holds, the assumption of finite speed ratios 
implies that within a Unite number of steps (5) will hold. But then the 
guards of the repetitive constructs are false, and all components will 
terminate nicely with (4) holding. The critical point is: can we guarantee 
that none of the components terminates too soon? 
We shall give an assertional proof, following the technique which has 
been pioneered by Gries and Owicki [l]. We call an assertion “universally 
true” if and only if it holds between any two atomic actions -i.e. “always” 
with respect to the computation, “everywhere” with respect to the text-. 
More precisely: proving the universal truth of an assertion amounts to 
showing 
1) that it holds at initialization 
2) that its truth is an invariant of each atomic action. 
In order to prove that none of the components terminates too soon, 
i.e. that termination implies that (4) holds, we have to prove the universal 
truth of 
(6) (W: ~Ul) or (4: Y~N=~AY)). 
Relation (6) certainly holds when the N components are started beoause 
initially all Fy[j] are true. We are only left with the obligation to prove 
the invariance of (6) ; the remaining part of this paper is devoted to that 
proof, and to how it can be discovered. 
We get a hint of the difficulties we may expect when trying to prove 
the invariance of (6) with respect to the first atomic alternative of Al: 
(y[i] = f{(y) -+ h[i] : = false) 
as soon as we realize that the first term of (6) is a compact notation for 
h[O] or h[l] or . . . or h[N-1] 
which only changes from true to false when, as a result of “h[i] : = false” 
the last true Q] disappears. That is ugly! 
We often prove mathematical theorems by proving a stronger -but, 
somehow, more manageable- theorem instead. In direct analogy: instead 
of trying to prove the invariant truth of (6) directly, we shall try to 
prove the invariant truth of a stronger assertion that we get by replacing 
the conditions y[j] =/f(y) by stronger ones. Because non R is stronger 
than & provided (& or R) holds, we can strengthen (6) into 
(7) (Ej: h[j]) or (Aj: non RI) 
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provided 
(8) (Aj: ~Lil=fh) 0~ %I 
holds, (Someone who sees these heuristics presented in this manner for 
the fist time may experience this as juggling, but I am afraid that it 
is quite standard and that we had better get used to it.) 
What have we gained by the introduction of the N predicates Rj? 
Well, the freedom to choose them! More precisely: the freedom to define 
them in such a way that we can prove the universal truth of (8) -which 
is structurally quite pleasant- in the usual fashion, while the universal 
truth of (7) -which is structurally equally “ugly” as (6)- follows more 
or less directly from the definition of the Rj’s: that is the way in which 
we may hope that (7) is more “manageable” than the original (6). 
In order to find a proper definition of the Rf’s, we analyse our obligation 
to prove the invariance of (8). 
If we only looked at the invariance of (8), we might think that a 
definition of the R,‘s in terms of y : 
would be a sensible choice. A moment’s reflection tells us that that 
def?nition does not help : it would make (8) universally true by definition, 
and the right-hand terms of (6) and (7) would be identical, whereas under 
the truth of (8), (7) was intended to be stronger than (6). 
For two reasons we are looking for a definition of the Rj’s in which 
the y does not occur: firstly, it is then that we can expect the proof of 
the universal truth of (8) to amount to something -and, thereby, to 
contribute to the argument-, secondly, we would like to conclude the 
universal truth of (7) -which does not mention y at all!- from the 
definition of the RJ’s. In other words, we propose a definition of the R,‘s 
which does not refer to y at all: only with such a definition does the 
replacement of (6) by (7) and (8) localize our dealing with y completely 
to the proof of the universal truth of (8). 
Because we want to define the Rj’s independently of y, because initially 
we cannot assume that for some j-value y[j]=f,(y) holds, and because 
(8) must hold initially, we must guarantee that initially 
(9) (Aj: Rd 
holds. Because, initially, all the h[j] are true, the initial truth of (9) 
is guaranteed if the RJ’S are defined in such a way that we have 
(10) (E j: non h[j]) or (A j: R,). 
We observe, that (10) is again of the recognized ugly form we are trying 
to get rid of. We have some slack - that is what the Rj’s are being intro- 
duced for - and this is the moment to decide to try to come away with 
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a stronger -but what we have called: “structurally more pleasant”- 
relation for the definition of the RJ’s, from which (10) immediately follows. 
The only candidate I can think of is 
(11) (A j : non Fy[j] or &) 
and we can already divulge that, indeed, (11) will be one of the defining 
equations for the RI'S, 
From (11) it follows that the algorithm will now start with all the 
Rj's true. From (8) it follows that the truth of RJ can be appreciated as 
“the equation Y[j] =f,(y) need not be satisfied”, and from (7) it follows 
that in our final state we must have all the Rf's equal to false. 
Let us now look at the alternative construct 
Ll : (if y[i] = f{(y) -+ h[i] : = false) 
[I Y[Wft(Y) -+ Y[il:=fr(Y)); 
L2j: (Aj: (h[j]:=true)) 
fi . 
We observe that the first alternative sets h[i] false, and that the second 
one, as a whole, sets all h[j] true. As far as the universal truth of (11) 
is concerned, we therefore conclude that in the ilrst alternative Rg is 
allowed to, and hence may become false, but that in the second alternative 
as a whole, all Rf's must become true. 
Let us now confront the two atomic alternatives with (8). Because, 
when the first atomic alternative is selected, only y[i] =/t(y) has been 
observed, the universal truth of (8) is guaranteed to be an invariant of 
the first atomic alternative, provided it enjoys the following property (12) : 
In the execution of the first atomic alternative 
(y[i] =/t(y) -+ h[i]: =false) 
(12) no Rj for j#i changes from true to false. 
Confronting the second atomic alternative 
(Y[G%(Y) + YPl:=MY)) 
with (8), and observing that upon its completion none of the relations 
y[j] = f,(y) needs to hold, we conclude that the second atomic alternative 
itself must already cause a final state in which all the Rf's are true, in 
spite of the fact that the subsequent assignments h[j]: = true -which 
would each force an RJ to true on account of (1 l)- have not been executed 
yet. In short : in our definition for the Rj's we must include besides (11) 
another reason why an R, should be defined to be true. 
As it stands, the second atomic alternative only modifies y, but we 
had decided that the definition of the R,'s would not be expressed in terms 
of y! The only way in which we can formulate the additional reason for 
an RI to be true is in terms of an auxiliary variable (to be introduced in 
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a moment), whose value is changed in oonjunction with the assignment 
to Y[i]. The value of that auxiliary variable has to force each RI to true 
until the subsequent assignment (h[j] : = true) does so via (11). Because 
the second atomic alternative is followed by N subsequent, separate atomic 
actions (h[j] : = true) -one for each value of j-, it stands to reason that 
we introduce for the i-th component cpnt~ an auxiliary local boolean array 
ss with elements sf[j] for 0 <j <N. Their initial (and “neutral”) value is 
true. The second atomic alternative of Ll sets them all to false, the atomic 
statements L2j will reset them to true one at a time. 
In contrast to the variables y and h, which are accessible to all com- 
ponents -which is expressed by calling them “global variables”-, each 
variable .s{ is only accessible to its corresponding component cpnt~ -which 
is expressed by calling the variable S{ “local” to component cpnt~-. 
Local variables give rise to so-called “local assertions”. Local assertions 
are most conveniently written in the program text of the individual 
components at the place corresponding to their truth: they state a truth 
between preceding and succeeding statements in exactly the same way 
as is usual in annotating or verifying sequential programs. If a local 
assertion contains only local variables, it can be justified on account of 
the text of the corresponding component only. 
In the following annotated version of cpnt~ we have inserted local 
assertions between braces. In order to understand the local assertions 
about sg it suffices to remember that sg is local to cpntt. The local assertion 
{Rc) in the second atomic alternative of Ll is justified by the guard 
y [i] +/r(y) in conjunction with (8). We have further incorporated in our 
annotation the consequence of (12) and the fact that the execution of 
a second alternative will never cause an R, to become false: a true Rg 
can only become false by virtue of the execution of the first alternative 
of Ll by cpntt itself! Hence, Rr is true all through the execution of the 
second alternative of cpnt{. 
cpntt : 
LO: do ((E j: h[j])) --f {(A j: s&j])} 
L1: (if y[i]=f+(y) --f h[i]:=false){Aj: ag[j]) 
[I Y[G+(Y) -+ 
(Rt]~[il:=ft(~); 
(A j: sJj]:=false))(Rg and (A j: non ~cj])}; 
L2j : (Aj: {Rt and non st[j]}(h[j]:=true; sp[j]:=true)) 
od fi WC ar[jl)] 
On account of (11) R, will be true upon completion of L2j. But the 
second atomic alternative of Ll should already have made RJ true, and 
it should remain so until L2j is executed. The precondition of L2j, as 
given in the annotation, hence tells us the “other reason besides 
(11) (A j: non h[j] or Rj) 
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why an R, should be defined to be true” : 
(13) (A i, j: non Rc or sf[j] or RI). 
Because it is our aim to get eventually all the Rj’s false, we define the 
Rj’s as the minimal solution of (11) and (13), minimal in the sense of: 
aa few RJ’S true as possible. 
The existence of a unique minimal solution of (11) and (13) follows 
from the following construction. Start with all Rj’s false -all equations 
of (13) are then satisfied on account of the term “non Ri”-. If all equations 
of (11) are satisfied as well, we are ready -no true RJ’S at all-; otherwise 
(11) is satisfied by setting RI to true for all j-values for which n[j] holds. 
Now all equations of (11) are satisfied, but some of the equations of (13) 
need no longer be satisfied: as long as an (i, j)-pair can be found for which 
the equation of (13) is not satisfied, satisfy it by setting that RI to true: 
as this cannot cause violation of (11) we end up with the Rj’s being a 
solution of (11) and (13). But it is also the minimal solution, because 
any Rf true in this solution must be true in any solution. 
For a value of i, for which 
(14) (Aj: ~l3) 
holds, the above construction tells us that the truth of Rt forces no 
further true RI’S via (13) ; consequently, when such an Rt becomes false, 
no other Rf-values are then affected. This, and the fact that the first 
atomic alternative of Ll is executed under the truth of (14) tells us, 
that with our definition of the RJ’S as the minimal solution of (11) and 
(13), requirement (12) is, indeed, met. 
We have proved the universal truth of (8) by de&ring the Rf’s as the 
minimal solution of (11) and (13). Th e universal truth of (7), however, 
is now obvious. If the left-hand term of (7) is false, we have 
(Aj: non h[j]), 
and (11) and (13) have as minimal solution all Rj’s false, i.e. 
(A j : non R,) 
which is the second term of (7). From the universal truth of (7) and (8), 
the universal truth of (6) follows, and our proof is completed. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This note has been written with many purposes in mind: 
1) To give a wider publicity to an unusual problem and the mathematics 
involved in its solution. 
2) To present a counterexample contradicting the much-propagated and 
hence commonly held belief that correctness proofs for programs are 
only laboriously belabouring the obvious. 
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3) To present a counterexample to the much-propagated and hence 
commonly held belief that there is an antagonism between rigour and 
formality on the one hand and “understandability” on the other. 
4) To present an example of a correctness proof in which the first-order 
predicate calculus is used as what seems an indispensable tool. 
5) To present an example of a correctness proof in which the first-order 
predicate calculus is a fully adequate tool. 
6) To show how fairly general -almost “syntactic”- considerations about 
the formal manipulations involved can provide valuable guidance for 
the discovery of a surprising and surprisingly effeotive argument, thus 
showing how a formal discipline can assist “creativity” instead of 
-as is sometimes suggested- hampering it. 
7) To show how also in such formal considerations the principle of sepa- 
ration of concerns can be recognized as a very helpful one. 
I leave it to my readers to form their opinion whether with the above 
I have served these purposes well. 
ACKNOWLEDQEMENTS 
I would like to express my gratitude to both IFIP WG2.3 and “The 
Tuesday Afternoon Club”, where I had the opportunity to discuss this 
problem. Those familiar with the long history that led to this note, 
however, know that in this case I am indebted to C. S. Scholten more 
than to anyone else. Comments from S. T. M. Ackermans, David Gries 
and W. M. Turski on an earlier version of this paper are gratefully 
acknowledged. 
REFERENCE 
1. Owioki, Susan and David Cries - Verifying Properties of Parallel Progmxm: 
An Axiom&o Approaoh, Comm. ACM 19, 6 279-286 (May 1976). 
215 
